Despite being the member of the international disarmament and non-proliferation conventions i.e. Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) which include their own specific export control regimes, some developed countries established parallel export control regimes that are against their commitments under aforementioned international instruments. These ad-hoc regimes are not open to all members of international community. These regimes would have always been used as a political leverage against targeted states by imposing restrictions and sanctions against them. They restrict the transfer of dual use equipment and materials and high-technology and know-how to targeted states that negatively affect their development process.This article examines how international relations theories can justify the establishment of international as well as ad-hoc non-proliferation regimes. We concluded that the conclusion of International non-proliferation instruments are based on liberal, neo-liberal and interdependence theories while establishing export control regimes are justified by constructivists, economic nationalists and postmodern theories.

Salman Farsi Treaty is in fact a "letter for protection" said to have Been issued in 9th century A.H. by the holy prophet (p.b.u.h) in favor of Salman"s childern and all his relatives in order to except them from Paying taxes and jeziye (religious taxes), should receive a share from the treasury and be respected by all Muslems. The treaty has been written by Imam Ali and signed by some of the great companions of Mohammad (p.b.u.h).

The concept of "non-proliferation regime" refers to policies and actions at national and international levels shaped in order to control WMD and high-tech transfer. This concept is related to the theory of "security regimes" as well as "multilateral arrangements export controls". In this article, after considering that theory and arrangements, particularly COCOM, NPT, MTCR and WASSENAAR, US security policy on the non-proliferation regime is surveyed.

Social security institution of the modem state is based on the lives of ordinary people who impaired and supported by the system. The most costly part of the system, the field of social support is relevant to people who are unable to do even a fraction of the price to pay for the services they receive. The Treaty of Imam Ali Malek Ashtar as part of the community determined by the lower classes and addressed those cases explicitly cites. He also determines the financial resources to spend manages and will be directly responsible for social security. Although, the ruling states fearing and humble person for the job Committee, Imam Ali's do it right and it provides for enforcement with the same title.

The treaty on prohibition of nuclear weapons was adopted on 20 September 2017 and up until now (July 2021), 53 states have acceded to it. The treaty, which is the international community’s latest legal action against nuclear weapons, entered into force on 22 January 2021. Iran confirmed the final text of the treaty at the UN conference in New York on 7 July 2017, but has so far failed to accede to it. This study analyzed the extent of the treaty’s influence on the process of nuclear disarmament and the delegitimization of nuclear weapons in the world. The consequences of the accession of Iran to this treaty were also studied and analyzed by employing a descriptive- analytical research method. The results portrayed that while the implementation of the treaty would strengthen the process of nuclear disarmament and delegitimization of nuclear weapons in the world and increase pressure against states with nuclear weapons, the strong objection of such states, would hinder the realization of the treaty goals. Furthermore, although Iran’s accession to the treaty may strengthen its international status in the campaign against nuclear weapons and its compliance with nuclear transparency, at the same time its accession may bring new international challenges for the country.

The two-year war between Iran and the Ottomans (1821-23) ended with the signing of the First Treaty of Erzurum. The Turkish text of the treaty differs in some places from its Persian version. There also exist several different versions of the text in Persian. An edited text is not yet available. In a published article, Qā em Maqā mi tried to present an emended text of the treaty. His work is incomplete though. In his review, Qā em Maqā mi did not see the Turkish text of the treaty itself. Certain renditions of the text of the treaty had not been published yet at the time and were not accessible to him. In the present article, first, several important but different editions of the treaty are introduced, and then the first Article of the treaty, containing several key points, is examined.

The "Design Law Treaty (DLT)" is a treaty whose draft was prepared by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and is going through the final stages of approval. The purpose of this treaty is to create coordination and homogenization of different legal systems in the field of administrative procedures and the process of registering industrial designs. In line with the drafting of the aforementioned treaty, many negotiations have been held with the participation of various legal systems and the different views expressed by them have created significant challenges in reaching a consensus regarding the finalization of the Design Law Treaty. This article aims to introduce the "Design Law Treaty" and some of its most important provisions briefly and answer the question of the point of view of different countries regarding the treaty and what their disagreements are in this regard. The present article finally concludes that developed countries support broader and stronger protection and standardization of national laws related to industrial designs. On the other hand, developing countries express concern about the accessibility, costs, and potential impact of the treaty on local innovative industries and businesses.

The conclusion of investment treaties between states, given the nature of national law and international law, is a new string of discussions between arbitrators and lawyers, which has created some of the issues that do not comply with the rules of the classical national law and international law. Conclusion of two separate but simultaneous agreements, the treaty between the state-state, and between the state-investor on the subject of separation and recognition of the contractual claims, and the treaty claims (considering the effects of determination of the applicable law and the competence of tribunals) have created considerable importance for the host states, exporting capital states, investment companies and arbitrators. In fact, separation of claims arising out the contract or the treaty not only, in case, makes the domestic courts or international tribunals to be qualified, but also affects on the law governing the dispute based on domestic law or international law principles.Therefore, several criteria have been considered for separation of disputes. Currently the most famous is still the classic standard of Jure Imperii and Jure Gestionis. It is also true in the subject of competent jurisdiction regarding the criteria for which shall the tribunal refer to the stage to accept or decline jurisdiction, whether the plausibility of claimant’s claim is sufficient or shall be considered the Prima Facie Criteria.

Counterclaims are very rare in treaty arbitration. According to UNCTAD, there have been over 800 treaty-based investor-state arbitrations to date, but unlike commercial arbitration and litigation, where a respondent is usually entitled to raise a counterclaim, the issue of counterclaims in treaty-based investment arbitration is problematic, or at least challenging, for arbitrators. Host State counterclaims in investment treaty arbitration are rarely raised and never successful, to the extent that one commentator has described their use as "thirty years of failure". This is mainly due to the nature of treaty arbitration, which operates as a triangular system where home and host States enter into an IIA, and investor benefits from the provisions of that IIA. This system often leads to an asymmetry of procedural rights, where only an investor can sue a host state, but not vice versa. This asymmetry in turn often leads to the deprivation of the right to bring counterclaims against investors. Nevertheless, counterclaims have an important role to play in treaty arbitration. While state counterclaims are permitted in principle under the ICSID Convention and the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, meeting the jurisdictional and admissibility requirements has proved more complex. This paper examines several key treaty provisions to identify those treaties that are more or less likely to extend a tribunal's jurisdiction “ratione materiae” over state counterclaims. The paper then examines the requisite connection that must exist between a counterclaim and the principal claim. A survey of international jurisprudence supports the paper's conclusion that recent treaty tribunal decisions have taken an unjustifiably narrow and often inconsistent approach to the requisite connection, to the extent that it may be virtually impossible for states to assert counterclaims under the current formulation. This paper proposes an alternative approach. This research examines the obstacles host states face in asserting counterclaims in investment treaty arbitration and critiques the reasoning of tribunals that have refused to hear state counterclaims. To this end, the paper proceeds in three substantive parts: it defines counterclaims, explains the overarching purpose of international investment law and arbitration, and promotes the potential value that a more permissive approach to host-state counterclaims could bring to the international investment regime. The paper agrees that investment tribunals should undertake the factual and legal assessment of the requisite nexus. However, in contrast to current practice, this paper recommends that legal nexus should be satisfied if a counterclaim relates to the same investment as the main claim, rather than insisting on symmetry in the legal instruments underlying the claims. This approach is likely to be more consistent with the jurisdiction of the tribunal as reflected in the relevant bilateral investment treaty. Crucially, this alternative approach also leaves open the possibility for state counterclaims to be based on the general domestic law of the host state. A greater role for host state counterclaims in investment treaty arbitration has the potential to save host states and foreign investors the time and expense of protracted battles in different fora over related disputes. Even in the same form, giving both parties the means to go on the offensive, rather than reserving this right to investors, may make states more willing to arbitrate and deter foreign investors from bringing weak claims. Despite these advantages, host state counterclaims are rarely brought and never successful. The first barrier is jurisdiction. Investment treaties make a standing offer to foreign investors which, once accepted, results in an arbitration agreement. This agreement determines the jurisdiction of the tribunal. The definition of the scope of disputes that the parties have agreed to submit to arbitration is of paramount importance. It will be easier for host states to assert counterclaims if the tribunal's jurisdiction is broad "ratione materiae", whether it is general, referring to "all disputes", or delineates several legal sources, such as authorizations and agreements. resolution clauses may limit the scope of the dispute to host state obligations or to the exclusive application of international law and/or the BIT. Other subsidiary provisions of the BIT may also help to limit the scope of the dispute. It will be easier for host states to assert counterclaims if they have locus standi or if the treaty explicitly directs the tribunal to apply the host state's general domestic law - but neither is determinative. The second obstacle is the requisite connection. A survey of international jurisprudence shows a general tendency to treat the requisite connection as a matter of both fact and law. The ICJ has adopted a flexible approach to the issue, treating both fact and law as relevant but neither as determinative. The Iran/US Claims Tribunal and treaty-based arbitral tribunals have taken a stricter approach, insisting on the symmetry of the legal instruments underlying the counterclaim and the claim. While a strict approach to legal symmetry may make sense in a commercial context, it does not apply to treaty-based arbitration because host states cannot assert counterclaims under the BIT. Nothing in the BIT test suggests that such a strict requirement is necessary. Moreover, tribunal practice suggests that counterclaims based on domestic law are prima facie inadmissible. The conclusion is that it would be virtually impossible for States to assert a counterclaim under the current formulation of the requisite connection test. Practice shows that counterclaims are in principle admissible in contract arbitration. However, their admissibility depends on certain factors: (1) the counterclaims must fall under the consent of the disputing parties (state and investor); and (2) they must be (closely) related to the main claim.

The World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty (WCT) is an international treaty on copyright law adopted by the member states of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in Geneva on December 20, 1996. It provides additional protections for copyright deemed necessary due to advances in information technology since the formation of previous copyright treaties before it. For example, it ensures that computer programs are protected as literary works (Article 4) and that the arrangement and selection of material in databases is protected (Article 5). This treaty had several effects on ligestlation of the member states, for example: WCT is cause of adoption Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) in United States law. Whereas 89 states signed this treaty, but Iran isn’t yet member of this treaty as Bern Convention and Trips Agreement.